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The Role of the Official Sector in
Sovereign Debt Workouts
Lee C. Buchheit*
I. INTRODUCTION

As tar babies go, few have proven stickier for the official sector 1 than the
plight of private sector lenders trying to recover their bad loans to foreign
governments. Inevitably, these lenders have looked to their own governments
for succor and protection against defaulting sovereign debtors. At several points
and in several ways over the last two centuries, the official sector has tried to
detach itself from this problem, only to discover how relentlessly adhesive it can
be.
The motivations for the official sector to involve itself in the affairs of
private lenders have changed over this period. During the nineteenth century,
the governments of countries in which the private lenders were located
("Creditor Governments") would occasionally champion the cause of their
citizen debtholders in response to domestic political pressure from those

citizens. In some cases, the Creditor Governments' motives were less benign.
Protecting private debtholders, for example, was the ostensible justification for
certain Creditor Governments assuming what one scholar has called "the orderly
administration of the debtor's fiscal affairs, as by the United States in the
Caribbean and bK England or the great powers in Egypt, Greece, Serbia, Turkey,
and elsewhere." In this context, of course, "orderly administration" meant
running all or a portion of the debtor country's finances.

Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
I

By "official sector," I mean, during the period prior to 1945, the governments of the countries in
which the private creditors were located and, during the period after 1945, those governments and
the international financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank
and the regional development banks) of which those governments are members and over which
they exercise significant influence.

2

Edwin Borchard, 1 State Insolvency and ForeignBondholders 236 (Yale 1951).
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After the First World War, and accelerating with the establishment of the
Bretton Woods institutions following the Second World War, official sector
lenders had another reason to promote orderly workouts of private sector claims
against distressed sovereign borrowers-the official sector was often itself a
lender to those same borrowers. Official sector credits were sometimes extended
bilaterally (government-to-government), sometimes multilaterally (through the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), World Bank and other international
financial institutions), and sometimes both. But, in all cases, failure by the
sovereign debtor to reach a satisfactory arrangement with its private sector
lenders could jeopardize the recovery of those official sector credits.
Finally, the integration of the world's financial and trading markets has
forced the official sector to view a sovereign debt problem in one country as a
potential source of disruption elsewhere. The financial and geopolitical
consequences of an unmanageable debt crisis can no longer be neatly contained
in a single country, or even a single region.
The official sector's search to find a satisfactory method of resolving
private sector claims against distressed sovereign borrowers, right down to the
IMF's proposal in 2002 for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
("SDRM"), can only be understood in light of this history. The official sector is
searching for a sovereign debt restructuring policy that will achieve each of the
following objectives:
1. Result in an orderly and expeditious readjustment of the claims of
private (and bilateral) lenders against financially distressed sovereigns;
2. Ensure that any new funds advanced by the Bretton Woods
institutions to a debtor country will be recoverable;
3. Minimize the risk of financial contagion in other debtor countries;
4. Encourage fiscal prudence on the part of the debtor and sound credit
decisionmaking on the part of the lenders;
5. Promote, or at least not impair, private credit flows to emerging
market borrowers generally; and
6. Shield the official sector from blame for having suffered the existence
of rogue creditors or rogue sovereign debtors.
It is a tall order and has not yet been filled.
As the motivations for official sector intervention have changed, so too
have the means. The establishment after the Second World War of the Bretton
Woods institutions (the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development
banks) gave Creditor Governments an entirely new instrument through which to
influence the behavior of sovereign debtors. Exercising influence through these
financial institutions had several advantages over traditional government-togovernment diplomacy. First, an organization such as the IMF places a useful
political cushion between the debtor country and the Creditor Governments.
Second, the debtor country is itself a member of the IMF; any scolding of the
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debtor or its economic policies has the flavor of a familial dispute rather than an
imperial reprimand. Finally, the organization is itself a prospective new lender
within its rights to insist on economic adjustment measures as a condition to
advancing fresh funds into a distressed situation.
For their part, private sector lenders have shown admirable consistency in
their view of official sector intervention in their debt recovery efforts. If official
sector pressure helped to induce ill-advised, undisciplined, and shortsighted
debtor governments to honor the contracts they signed with foreign lenders,
then this intervention was both welcome and wholly justified. But if the official
sector even twitched with empathy for a fellow sovereign unable to pay its
foreign debts, lenders saw unwarranted interference with normal commercial
relationships.

II. OFFICIAL SECTOR RESPONSES
The official sector's role in the recovery of private loans to foreign
sovereigns can be divided into at least three historical phases.
A. ENTER THE DIPLOMATS
For most of the last two hundred years, disappointed private lenders to
foreign sovereigns had very few options other than to seek the help of their own
governments. The prevailing sovereign immunity rules of this era-the doctrine
of "absolute" sovereign immunity-meant that sovereigns could not be sued in
foreign courts without their express consent. An unpaid bondholder was thus,
for want of better options, likely to be an importunate bondholder. The Foreign
Office, the State Department, and their equivalents in other countries were the
recipients of these pleas for intercession with defaulting foreign sovereigns.
Public international law, of course, provided a legal basis for this
intercession: a state had a legitimate interest in seeing that its subjects were not
mistreated by foreign states. The failure to honor foreign debts owed to one's
subjects was regarded as an example of such mistreatment.4
As a general rule, Creditor Governments resented being importuned by
their citizen bondholders, and did not relish the political pressure that those
bondholders could bring to bear. The most famous expression of this
impatience is to be found in a January 1848 Circular sent by Lord Palmerston to
Her Majesty's representatives in foreign states. Palmerston robustly asserted the
British Government's legal authority to "interfere authoritatively" in support of
"the unsatisfied claims of British subjects who are holders of public bonds and
3
4

See Ian Brownlie, Pindples of PublicInternationalLaw504-05 (Clarendon 2d ed 1973).
See Borchard, 1 State Insolveny andForeignBondholders at 230-31 (cited in note 2).
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money securities" of foreign states. Nevertheless, the question of whether to
exercise that authority in any particular case was wholly a matter of government
discretion. The private lenders-tinctured as they were by the unpatriotic act of
having invested their money abroad rather than at home-were admonished not
to expect Her Majesty's sympathy.
It has hitherto been thought by the successive Governments of Great
Britain undesirable that British subjects should invest their capital in loans
to foreign Governments instead of employing it in profitable undertakings
at home, and with a view to discourage hazardous loans to foreign
Governments who may be either unable or unwilling to pay the stipulated
interest thereupon, the British Government has hitherto thought it the best
policy to abstain from taking up as international questions, the complaints
made by British subjects against foreign Governments which have failed to
make good their engagements in regard to such pecuniary transactions.
For the British Government has considered that the losses of imprudent
men who have placed mistaken confidence in the good faith of foreign
Governments would prove a salutary warning to others, and would prevent
any other Foreign Loans from being raised in Great Britain except by
5
Governments of known good faith and of ascertained solvency.
In a few instances in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Creditor Governments did not just intercede verbally on behalf of their
aggrieved bondholders-they intervened physically in the debtor countries
themselves. Foreign powers compelled Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, Greece,
Haiti, and several other countries to accept the "orderly administration" of their
fiscal affairs. 6 Occasionally, the threat of military force, and even more
occasionally actual force, was employed to vindicate the rights of aggrieved
bondholders. 7 The most notorious such incident occurred in 1902 when British
and German warships fired on Venezuelan coastal fortifications and threatened
to occupy Venezuelan territory until debts to their subjects had been satisfied.
The cynical but realistic explanation of these interventions is that the
Creditor Governments used their citizens' unsatisfied claims as a pretext for
achieving political objectives. This produced a famous doctrinal backlash. The
Argentine jurist Luis Drago, writing in 1907, voiced what became known as the

5

Viscount Palmerston, CircularAddressed by Viscount Palmerston to Her Majesty's Representatives in
Foreign States, Respecting the Debts Due by Foreign States to British Subjects (UK Foreign Office Jan
1848), in D.C.M. Platt, Finance, Trade, and Politics in British ForeignPoAi: 1815-1914, App 2 at 398-

6

99 (Oxford 1968).
See Borchard, 1 State Insolvency and ForeignBondholders at 286-96 (cited in note 2).

7

Id at 269-71.
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Drago Doctrine: the public debt of a country cannot occasion armed
intervention or actual occupation of the territory of the sovereign debtor.
While the United States remained a debtor country-from its inception
through the nineteenth century-it rarely had to confront these issues. But after
the First World War, America became a net lender to other countries. At this
point, the Executive Branch of the US Government felt that it needed to
supervise loans made by private sector investors to foreign governments,
particularly the European countries attempting to recover from the effects of the
war. It was a regrettable, and later regretted, decision.
In what became known as the "Rule of March 3, 1922," President Harding
and Secretary of State Charles Evan Hughes announced publicly that the State
Department wished to be consulted before American bankers extended loans
abroad. The Rule was not a formal legal requirement, but most bankers
understood that compliance was not wholly discretionary. Although the text of
the Rule of March 3, 1922 was very careful to warn that the State Department
"[would not] pass upon the merits of foreign loans as business propositions, nor
assume any responsibility whatever in connection with loan transactions, ' 9 this
warning was widely discounted by the market. Many investors believed that if
the State Department had cleared the loan in the first place, then State
Department assistance should be expected if the loan went into default.
A distressingly large number of those foreign loans did in fact go into
default after the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing depression. As a
presidential candidate in 1932, Franklin D. Roosevelt fiercely condemned the
Rule of March 3, 1922 and declared that, were he elected president, "it will no
longer be possible for international bankers. .. to sell to the investing public of
America foreign securities on the implied understanding that these securities
have been passed on or aproved by the State Department or other agency of
the Federal Government. "
When Mr. Roosevelt became President, he quickly moved to distance the
Executive Branch from any direct involvement in the negotiation of settlements
of private loans to foreign governments. The operative word in the prior
sentence is "direct." In 1933, the Roosevelt Administration encouraged the
formation of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council ("FBPC'). This
organization, modeled on the Corporation of Foreign Bondholders of Great
Britain (which had been operating with some success since the 1860s), had the
8

See Luis Drago, State Loans in Their Relation to InternationalPoliy (1907), translated in Leo Gross, ed,
InternationalLaw in the Twentieth Century 483, 503 (Appleton-Century-Crofts 1969).

9

James H. Ronald, National OqaniZationsfor the Protection of Holders of Foreign Bonds, 3 Geo Wash L
Rev 411, 437 n 109 (1935).
Id at 441.

10

Summer 2005

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

self-appointed task of negotiating with defaulting sovereign debtors in the hope
of arranging settlements that could be recommended to American bondholders.
The FBPC was set up as a private, not-for-profit corporation, but it openly
carried the blessing and support of the US Government in its discussions with
foreign governments. By encouraging the formation of the FBPC in 1933, the
that they had pushed the foreign debt problem off
American authorities hoped
1
of their political plates. 1
And, for a while, they did. But by the late 1930s, in the face of a
deteriorating political situation in Europe and a perception that the FBPC was
losing its effectiveness, the US State Department decided that it again had to
intervene directly in debt settlement negotiations with foreign governments. In
part, this was done in order to regularize the debtor countries' relations with
existing private creditors so that bilateral US aid could flow to those countries.
After less than a decade of private sector efforts to shift the responsibility for
negotiating foreign debt settlements to actors such as the FBPC, the tar baby
was again clinging to the fingers of the Executive Branch of the US
Government. 12
B. ENTER THE JUDICIARY
Historically, Creditor Governments took responsibility for representing
their citizen bondholders' interests because, absent such diplomatic pressure, the
bondholders lacked any other effective remedy beyond feeble threats to boycott
future debt issuances by the country concerned. By the middle of the twentieth
century, however, a number of important creditor countries concluded that the
absolute theory of sovereign immunity was outdated. If foreign sovereigns
participated in commercial affairs beyond their own borders, this view held, why
should they not be answerable in foreign courts for their commercial conduct?
Under this "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity, the judiciary would have
principal responsibility for hearing the claims of disappointed creditors of
foreign sovereign borrowers, thus relieving diplomats of this disagreeable task.
In the United States, this restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was first
formally acknowledged as State Department policy in 1952.13 In 1976, the
n See Gene A. Sessions, Prophyingupon the Bones: J. Reuben Clark and the Foreign Debt Crisis, 1933-39
32 (Illinois 1992) ("[A]fter the October 1933 conference [that led to the formation of the FBPC],
the administration felt that the problem of people who held foreign bonds was out of its hands
and good riddance.").
12 See Michael R. Adamson, The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council Experiment, 19341940, 76 Bus Hist Rev 479, 507 (2002).
13 See Jack B. Tate, Letter Addressed to Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman by the
Department's Acting Legal Adviser, 26 Dept State Bull 984-85 June 23, 1952) (stating that "it
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restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was codified in the United States by the
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"). 14 Two years later,
the United Kingdom enacted the State Immunities Act 1978.
If the official sector thought that it had permanently shifted the private
creditor problem onto the judiciary, it was mistaken. Just six years after the
passage of the FSIA, in August 1982, Mexico declared a moratorium on the
repayment of most categories of its commercial bank debt. When many other
debtor countries followed Mexico's lead over the next 18 months, a truly global
debt crisis ensued. It would last for another decade.
The official sector-including at this point both Creditor Governments
and the multilateral financial institutions to which they belonged-were
intimately involved at every stage of the global debt crisis of the 1980s and early
1990s.15 They had no choice. The commercial banks that had lent hundreds of
billions of dollars to emerging market sovereigns formed a crucial part of the
domestic financial systems in the creditor countries. Most of those lending
institutions also benefited from government-sponsored deposit insurance
programs. Had the debt crisis spun out of control, the domestic financial
systems of the Creditor Governments would have been seriously undermined.
Apart from those domestic financial concerns, there was the obvious
geopolitical angle. Mexico, to take just one example, aside from being a major
trading partner of the United States, had 70 million citizens in close geographical
proximity to the US border. The United States could not view with equanimity
the prospect of economic, social, or political instability in Mexico as a result of a
mishandled foreign debt crisis.
Significantly, this direct and intensive involvement of the official sector in
the workout of private sector loans to sovereign borrowers during the 1980s was
not intended to displace the availability of legal remedies conveyed by the FSIA
and equivalent laws in other countries. 16 Creditors could always resort to the
judiciary if they were disposed to do so, they were just strongly encouraged not to

14

15

16

will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in
the consideration of requests of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign immunity").
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub L No 94-583, 90 Stat 2891 (1976), codified at 28 USC §
1330, 13 3 2(a), 1391(o, 1441(d), 1602-1611.

See L. Buchheit, A Change ofHat:.... U.S. Govemment's Role in Sovereign Debt Restructurings,9 Intl Fin
L Rev 12 (June 1990).
The most memorable expression of this policy appears in an amicus curiae brief filed by the US
Government in a lawsuit in the mid-1 980s. This brief told a federal court that "[t]he United States
supports the cooperative and negotiated resolution of international debt problems ... within a
context in which legal principles require enforcement of international loan agreements." Brief of
Amicus Curiae United States, Allied Bank Intl v Banco Credito Agicola de Cartago, 757 F2d 516 (2d

Cir 1985) (No 83-7713).
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do so. When this encouragement originated from a commercial bank regulator
and was directed at a regulated commercial bank, it carried force.
Debtor countries could also feel the sting of official sector disapproval if
they toyed with unilateral measures that purported to interfere with the legal
position of their foreign lenders. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the official
sector ran the sovereign debt restructuring business much like Wyatt Earp ran
Tombstone, Arizona on a Saturday night: there could be as much shouting and
blaspheming as you wanted, but everybody had to check their guns before they
came into town.
Official sector propaganda during this period warned that litigation could
not resolve large sovereign debt defaults. The only effective path, they argued,
was negotiated settlement by the debtor and its creditors encouraged, when
necessary, by an official sector boot to the uncooperative posterior. But the
official sector strongly believed that the availability of legal remedies to the
creditors served a therapeutic in terrorem function; they reinforced the message to
the debtor that however disagreeable negotiations with creditors may be, the
alternative was much nastier. The result was widespread forbearance from
litigation by commercial bank creditors during the 1980s and early 1990s. But
this, in turn, left in doubt whether legal remedies in national courts would
effectively ensure recoveries by private lenders in future sovereign debt
workouts if more cooperative restructuring techniques failed.
In 2001, Argentina's default on approximately $100 billion of its bond
indebtedness removed that doubt. Argentina did not offer to restructure its
indebtedness for another three years, and in this time hundreds of lawsuits were
filed against the country. As of the date of this writing, some of those lawsuits
have resulted in court judgments, but few, if any, have produced financial
recoveries for the creditors. In the light of this experience, the markets now
seem to believe that legal remedies alone are unlikely to be a satisfactory
recourse for private sector debtholders, at least if the sovereign default is large
enough or persists long enough.
Separately, the official sector has, since the Mexican devaluation crisis of
1994-95 and the Asian debt crisis of 1997, devoted much of its effort toward
exploring possible changes to credit documentation and debt restructuring
techniques that would facilitate orderly sovereign debt workouts. 17 The most
notable success achieved in this area has been the widespread incorporation of
collective action clauses in sovereign bonds governed by New York law. The
official sector's motive in encouraging these reforms has had obvious elements
of self interest. If the private lenders and their sovereign borrowers can find
17

These brainstorming exercises are described in Lex Rieffel, RestructuringSovereign Debt: The Casefor
Ad Hoc Machinery 220-59 (Brookings Inst 2003).
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contractual techniques to expedite the debt restructuring process, there will be
less occasion for official sector intervention in the process, and therefore less
occasion for criticism of the official sector. In addition, market-based debt
restructuring techniques were seen as the alternative to the official sector bailout
technique of the 1990s; a technique that invited hand wringing about moral
hazard.
C. ENTER THE IMF
The most significant change in the official sector response to this problem
over the last twenty years has resulted from the evolving role of the IMF. Ever
since the start of the global debt crisis in 1982, the IMF has played multiple
functions in sovereign debt workouts. It acted, at least during the early 1980s, as
something of a master of ceremonies directing all involved parties-the debtor,
assigned roles. 18
the private lenders and the bilateral creditors-toward their
Usually, the IMF is also a lender in its own right. Because it is advancing
funds into an already distressed situation, the IMF has the negotiating leverage
to require the debtor to implement economic adjustment measures and to
require other lenders to defer or moderate their claims against the debtor to
produce a sustainable debt profile. Viewed historically, this represents a major
advance over earlier methods by which the official sector attempted to influence
the behavior of errant sovereigns. In the nineteenth century, the historical
equivalent of today's G-7 may have simply taken over the running of a debtor
country's fiscal affairs. In the twenty-first century, the same result can sometimes
be accomplished through the less intrusive tool of IMF conditionality.
The IMF's desire to safeguard its own lending has provided the principled
justification for the Fund's involvement in debtor countries' dealings with
private creditors. As a matter of policy, the Fund will not lend into a situation in
which the debtor has built up arrears to its other creditors unless the IMF can be
reasonably confident that the country will be able to reach an accommodation
19
with all or most of its other lenders. This "lending into arrears" policy has
allowed the Fund to monitor and, in some cases, visibly influence a debtor
country's debt management strategy. It has also thrust the IMF into the
uncomfortable position of being seen by some private creditors as the anointed

18
19

See Joseph Kraft, The Mexican Rescue 47-55 (Group of Thirty 1984).
IMF, Fund Poligf on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors-FurtherConsideration of the Good Faith
Criterion (uly 30, 2002), available online at <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
privcred/073002.pdf> (visited Mar 26, 2005).
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official sector
instrument of reprimand and correction for wayward sovereign
20
borrowers.
In the more recent sovereign bond restructurings, the IMF's role has been
poorly understood. When negotiating a debtor country's economic recovery
program-a precondition to most Fund lending-the Fund staff must make a
projection about the country's future debt servicing capacity. This projection
identifies the amount of money that the country can be expected to devote
toward the servicing of all classes of its debt. Remove from this figure the
resources needed to service the debtholders (like the IMF itself) that will not be
expected to restructure their credits, and what is left will define the genetic code,
the financial DNA, of the ensuing debt restructuring for the country's private
and bilateral creditors. A sovereign debtor cannot agree to pay materially more
than the programmed amounts to its creditors (unless it is prepared to raise taxes
or tax other offsetting measures) without placing its entire IMF arrangement in
jeopardy. Of course, no creditor is ever bluntly deprived of the illusion of free
will and independence in negotiating with the sovereign debtor the terms of its
own restructuring, but behind the scenes a Calvinistic predestination has already
been at work. When private sector lenders finally understand this feature of
modern sovereign debt restructuring (not many seem to understand yet), they
may be even less fond of the official sector.
III. CONCLUSION
For nearly two centuries, the official sector has tried to distance itself from
direct responsibility for the fate of private sector lenders to sovereign debtors.
The latest effort came in 2002 when the management of the IMF proposed a
formal Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism that would have established an
independent framework for handling future sovereign debt problems along the
lines of a transnational bankruptcy code. 2 1 The SDRM was intended to
accomplish what the diplomats, gunboat captains, administrators, and judges of
the last two hundred years failed to achieve: an effective method by which the
official sector could encourage orderly workouts of private sector claims against
distressed sovereigns without shouldering the full moral, political, and financial
responsibility for these workouts.
20

21

As exemplified by the comment of a large European bank following the closing of Argentina's
bond exchange offer in February 2004: "We do believe that Argentina could afford to service
better terms than are provided by the current offer ... [but] with the international community
apparently unwilling to apply any significant pressure on Argentina to improve the terms,
bondholders are left with little leverage." Craig Karmin and Mark Whitehouse, Argentina's Hardball
May Pay; Majority of Bondholders Expected to Take 30 Cents on Dollar, Wall St J C16 (Mar 3, 2005)
(quoting Deutsche Bank's "client note advocating the [proposed] deal").
Anne 0. Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring(IMF 2002).
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For reasons described elsewhere in this volume,22 the SDRM proposal did
not prosper. Curiously, the private markets' main fear seems to be that SDRM
would become a more efficient medium through which the geopolitical wishes
of the G-7 governments could be imposed on private sector lenders. There are
grounds for believing, however, that this was precisely what the SDRM was
intended to avoid. One way of explaining the SDRM proposal is to view it as an
effort to establish a rule-based framework for processing sovereign debt
workouts with a minimum of official sector interference. The charm of SDRM
in the eyes of its sponsors, and the fervent hope of those sponsors, was that by
channeling these matters into an institutional framework, the official sector
might escape the relentless pressure and criticism it has received for over two
centuries for its role in sovereign debt workouts.
The Argentine bond exchange offer that closed at the end of February,
2005 poignantly demonstrates the official sector's uncomfortable position in
these affairs. Throughout the three years of default that preceded Argentina's
offer to exchange its approximately $100 billion of outstanding bonds, the
official sector (principally in the form of the US Government and the IMF)
appeared to be unusually detached from the process. It did not openly support,
nor did it openly criticize, Argentina's approach to the debt restructuring. Unlike
most prior sovereign debt workouts, the official sector refrained from carrying
out its customary functions as referee and drover.
Some of the bondholders viewed this restraint as an abdication of official
sector responsibility. 23 Other commentators, however, praised the official
sector's new found policy of abstention, arguing that the Argentine case showed
that "borrowers and lenders can work out bond defaults on their own." 24 This
judgment would no doubt strike some of the bondholders as a bit like
concluding that World War I stands for the proposition that, left on their own,
nations can work out their differences. Thus, unable to let go, unwilling to take
charge, and historically incapable of striking a happy compromise between the
two, the official sector's role in future sovereign debt workouts will remain ad
hoc and unpredictable.

J Intl
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See Anne 0. Krueger and Sean Hagan, Sovereign Workouts: An IMF Perspective, 6 Chi
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(2005).
See, for example, the anguished comment of a holder of Argentine bonds following the closing of

24

that country's bond exchange offer in February, 2005: "The IMF has relinquished its role as
protector of the financial markets." Argentina: Investors Throw in the Towel, Intl Fin Rev 76 (Feb 26,
2005).
Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Americas: Argentina's Lessons for Global Creditors, Wall St J
A15 (Mar 4, 2005).
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